I. INTRODUCTION
Chile has been a pioneer in Latin America in two ways: introducing a public social security pension programme and implementing a structural reform (privatizing it); both initiatives have had significant influence in other countries in the region, and on the structural reform in other parts of the world, too.
Twenty-five years after the reform was implemented, it is fitting to make a thorough evaluation of its effects inside Chile and in the region. Herein we summarize the process of reform in Chile, evaluate its effects, compare the main effects of the Chilean model with other similar reforms in Latin America, and extract lessons from the Chilean experience.
A public pension system is normally characterized by a non-defined contribution (because it tends to increase in the long run), a defined benefit (as it is guaranteed and specified by law), a pay-as-you-go financial regime (without reserves or with partial reserves), and public management. A structural reform transforms a public system, totally or partially, into a private system characterized by defined contribution (theoretically it should not increase in the long run), non-defined benefit (the pension is uncertain), fully funded financing (with individual account pension funds owned by the insurance and used to finance their pensions), and private management. In addition to Chile, nine countries in Latin America have implemented a structural pension reform following three models: (a) substitutive, where the public system is closed and replaced by a private system, as in Chile (1981) , Bolivia and Mexico (1997), El Salvador (1998) , and the Dominican Republic (2003-6) ; (b) parallel, where the public system is not closed but reformed, a private system is created, and the two compete against each other, as in Peru (1993) and Colombia (1994) ; and (c) mixed, where the public system continues as a first pillar that pays a basic pension, and a second private pillar is added that pays a supplementary pension, as in Argentina (1994) , Uruguay (1996), and Costa Rica (2001) . A substitutive reform approved in Nicaragua (2004) has been suspended indefinitely because of the high fiscal cost of the transition, while a mixed model passed in Ecuador (2004) has been halted by an unconstitutional appeal before the Supreme Court. The percentage of workers affiliated to the private systems (the rest are in the public system) in the reformed countries in 2004 varied from 50 per cent in Colombia, to 98 per cent in Chile, and 100 per cent in Bolivia and Mexico (Table 1 ). The remaining eight Latin American countries maintain their public systems and several have implemented or are discussing parametric (non-structural) reforms to strengthen them (Mesa-Lago, 2004 , 2005 , 2006 .
The evaluation of the Chilean reform focuses on three types of effects: (a) macroeconomic (fiscal costs, national savings); (b) microeconomic (contributions, competition, administrative costs, capital returns, portfolio diversification, and development of the capital market), and (c) social (coverage, density of contributions and level of pensions, replacement rates, gender inequality, and redistribution). Twelve indicators of the effects of the Chilean case are compared in Table 1 with those of the other nine Latin American countries with structural reforms.
II. SUMMARY OF THE CHILEAN PENSION REFORM: 1980-1
At the end of the 1970s Chile's public pension system was fragmented into 35 funds or schemes with significant differences in coverage, entitlement conditions, contributions, and financial status, although most suffered financial imbalance. In 1979 the military government unified the existing public pension funds, and raised and standardized the retirement age and the level of contributions. In 1980, the public system was closed (except for the armed forces scheme, that remains public and unchanged) and replaced by a new private system (with the four characteristics described above) that started to function in May 1981. A short period was given for those insured to stay in the public system or move to the private one; all new workers must join the private system. The employer contribution was eliminated and workers must pay 10 per cent of their income (defined contribution) that is deposited in individual accounts managed by private for-profit corporations which exist for this sole purpose (Administradoras de Fondo de Pensiones-AFPs); in addition, workers must pay a commission to the AFP for the administration of the old-age programme, part of which is a premium transferred to private insurance companies to cover risks associated with disability and survivors (the insured person's dependants).
Pensions are financed by the fund accumulated in the insured's individual account and can be paid as an annuity, programmed withdrawal, or a combination of both. 'Non-defined' benefit means that the level of the pension is uncertain and will depend on five factors: (a) the amount of the contributions Weighted in coverage (by population), administrative costs (based on total income and total costs) and compliance (based on total affiliates and total contributors), rest non-weighted. j In the biggest two, no data available on the biggest three. k There are no fiscal costs because the public system pays all current pensions and the main pension, and all insured are in the two pillars (public and private). Source: Mesa-Lago (2005 , 2006 ; number of administrators and concentration from AIOS (2005); fiscal cost from Gill et al. (2005) , except Chile from Table 2. deposited in the individual account during the working life of the insured; (b) the capital returns on the investment of the fund in such an account; (c) the life expectancy of the old-age pensioner; (d) the gender of the pensioner; and (e) the number, age, and life expectancy of the insured's dependants. Contributions paid to the old public system by those insured who moved to the private system are estimated in a 'recognition bond', that is annually adjusted to inflation and accrues an interest rate. The bond can only be cashed into the pension fund at the time of retirement, disability, or death.
All variables in the system (deposits, investment, benefits) are measured in 'Unidades de Fomento' (UF), an accounting unit automatically adjusted to inflation-hence pensions are adjusted to the cost of living. Men can retire at age 65 and women at age 60. Nevertheless, the insured who accumulate a certain amount in their individual accounts (to guarantee at least a minimum pension) can retire before the statutory age. Although the system is private, it is mandatory and operates under strict control and regulation by the state through the Superintendence of AFP. The next three sections evaluate the macroeconomic, microeconomic, and social effects of the Chilean private system, and compare them with those of the other nine Latin American countries with structural reforms.
III. MACROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CHILEAN REFORM
During the transition, Chile's structural reform has provoked high and prolonged fiscal costs, greater than the capital accumulation in the pension fund, thus resulting in a negative impact on national savings.
(i) Fiscal Costs
The structural reform, rather than eliminating the role of the state in the pension system, expanded it in terms of regulation, supervision, guarantees, and financing. Among the last the state took the following responsibilities that resulted in substantial fiscal costs: (a) the operational deficit in the old public system until all its beneficiaries are dead, which results because it was left with all ongoing and future public pensions, but with a minor fraction of the contributors; (b) recognition bonds; (c) guaranteed minimum pensions in the private system for the insured with at least 20 years of contributions and whose individual accounts are insufficient to finance such pensions; (d) social assistance (noncontributory) pensions to people over 65 years old or disabled, who are poor ('indigent') and lack any contributory pension coverage; and (e) the deficit of the public pensions of the armed forces and the police. The operational deficit and the recognition bonds are transitory fiscal costs that will last until the years 2050 and 2038, respectively, while the minimum, social-assistance, and military pensions are permanent fiscal costs (Mesa-Lago, 2004 ).
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(ii) National Savings and Projections
The World Bank and various countries advocated the pension reform upon the premise that it would increase national savings. There are three obstacles to measuring the net effect of the reform on national savings in Chile: (a) the lack of data previous to the reform in 1981 because there were 35 pension funds, most of them did not publish statistics, and there was not a consolidated evaluation of their impact on national savings; (b) the absence of a historical assessment of the evolution of national saving and the effect of changes in private savings of the various components such as pensions, other financial assets, etc.; and (c) the need to contrast the impact on national savings of the system with and without the reform. Chile's pension reform was part of a wider structural reform that included fiscal adjustment, labour market, financial liberalization, and capital market reforms. 'The complementarity of these reforms makes it extremely difficult to properly isolate the impact of a specific reform.' A Chilean expert has found some evidence that part of the increase in national savings can be traced to the pension reform. Most of the increase in savings, however, results from a rise in public savings (that were not fully offset by private dissaving) and by other structural changes, such as tax reform, that triggered a sharp increase in corporate saving rates (Gill et al., 2005, pp. 54, 119) .
Nevertheless it can be asserted that the pension reform in Chile did not bring major cost savings to the public purse in 25 years. For the period 1981-2004, when the fiscal costs of the reform are subtracted from the capital accumulation generated by the pension funds, both as annual percentages of GDP, we get the following results: average fiscal costs (5.5 per cent) doubled average capital accumulation (2.5 per cent), leading to a net deficit (-3 per cent of GDP). As the pension system matures the net deficit will eventually turn into a net surplus, but the length of the transition (more than 40 years) poses a significant difficulty in estimating the long-term effects of the fiscal deficit on public financehence the importance of previously determining the means of coping with such a heavy burden. In Chile the deficit in the pension system was accompanied by an adjustment in the fiscal balance of the central government (excluding pensions) that generated an annual average surplus of 8.5 per cent of GDP in 1981 GDP in -2004 , which allowed the state to finance the pension deficit (Arenas de Mesa, 2005) . If Chile had not had fiscal discipline and a surplus, the reform would have been very difficult to finance and created significant fiscal imbalances and instability or forced substantial increases in taxes to finance the deficit.
As the private pension system has matured, not only the size of the deficit but also its composition have changed. The transitory components of the deficit will gradually disappear (first the operational deficit and later the recognition bond), while one permanent component (the minimum pension) will increase; the military deficit and the social assistance pension will evolve based on policy decisions taken by the government. Projections for 2005-10 (30 years after the reform), show that the annual average total deficit will remain high at 5 per cent (only 0.5 points lower than the 1981-2004 average), proving that the projections made in the 1980s were rather optimistic as they significantly underestimated the fiscal costs of the reform. The operational deficit average will decrease from 3.3 per cent to 2 per cent of GDP in the period, while the average cost of the recognition bond will double from 0.6 per cent to 1.2 per cent, and the other costs will remain basically unchanged (Table 2 , bottom section).
Chilean fiscal costs are the highest among the eight Latin American countries that have available data and 2.4 times their average (Table 1) , because of the relative generosity of Chile's benefits during the transition. Other countries have cut fiscal costs by denying or restricting the recognition bond and the minimum pension and not granting a social assistance pension (Bolivia and Peru, in particular) at the cost of insured welfare (Mesa-Lago, 2004) . Projections of the World Bank for 2050 show that in five countries (Argentina, Chile, El Salvador, Mexico, and Peru), the fiscal cost of maintaining an unreformed public system would have been smaller than the cost of a structural reform for a transition period between 33 and 55 years, and in some countries at the cost of sacrificing insured benefits. Chile's ability to finance the high and prolonged cost of the reform based on fiscal discipline and a nonpension surplus, has not been replicated in other countries in the region, a point acknowledged by the World Bank (Gill et al., 2005) .
IV. MICROECONOMIC EFFECTS OF THE CHILEAN REFORM
Chile's structural reform has had the following effects: the elimination of the employer's contribution; high and sustained administrative costs paid solely by the insured; flaws in competition; di-versification of the portfolio after an early concentration in public debt; significant capital accumulation (but not an increase in national savings, as explained already); a contribution to the development of financial and capital markets; and capital returns that discriminate against low-income insured, and are higher for those who joined the system early rather than later.
(i) Contributions and Administrative Costs
Commissions charged by the AFPs are deducted from wages, paid by the insured, set freely by the AFPs, and are of two types: a fixed sum and a variable percentage (a commission on the account balance applied in the early years was eliminated in 1988). The fixed commission has regressive effects because it is proportionally higher for the lowincome insured (as it reduces their net deposits in individual accounts, capital returns, and pension levels) than for the high-income insured (see section IV (iii) The percentage of taxable income deducted for deposit in the individual accounts is a uniform 10 per cent for all insured; combined with the commission, the total was 12.26 per cent in 2004, a percentage considerable lower that the 18.6-20.7 per cent charged to the insured who remain in the public system. The lower rates of contribution in the private system and the corresponding increase in wages, at least in the short run, were possible because of savings from the unification of the multiple pension funds in 1979 and the increase in the age of retirement, but such savings were not passed to the insured in the public system, in order to stimulate the shift to the private system (Mesa Lago, 2004) .
The average total contribution of the ten private systems was 11.9 per cent in 2004, ranging from 7 per cent in Argentina (the original contribution was cut in half because of the crisis) to 15 per cent in Uruguay. Three countries, including Chile, eliminated the employer contribution, two reduced it, and five retained it; the average share of the worker in the total contribution in the ten countries was 65.2 per cent, hence violating the International Labor Office (ILO) minimum standard that requires that the worker share does not exceed 50 per cent (Table 1) . It is impossible here to assess if the elimination of the employer's contribution may have increased real wages over the medium to long run, as that exercise would require data on real wages or the share of wages on income.
Data on the operational costs of the AFPs are fragmented and contradictory. In 1981 the public system had 3,500 employees and was one of the largest public bureaucracies in Chile; in 1990 the number of AFP employees was around 8,000 and about 30 per cent of them were salesmen. Combined expenditures on fees for salesmen and publicity took 39.7 per cent of total operational expenditures in 1997, a proportion that decreased to 25.7 per cent in 2004 (owing to the restrictions in movements that cut salesmen's fees and advertising); conversely, the AFP profit margin as a percentage of income from commissions rose from 19.2 to 38 per cent in 1998 (AIOS, 2000 , 2005 . Because the public system does not have these two types of expenditures (nor a profit) it is difficult to compare its administrative costs and efficiency with those in the private system. Total administrative costs in the entire pension system (combining the private and public schemes) have been estimated as twice the costs of the public systems before the reform, partly owing to the coexistence of both schemes during the transition (Arenas de Mesa and Gumucio, 2000) . Based on standardized calculations of administrative costs as a percentage of revenue in 14 pension systems in the region, the average in the ten private systems (based on the commission for the old-age programme, excluding the premium) was 20 per cent in 2004, contrasted with an average of only 3.5 per cent in four public systems (Mesa-Lago, 2006) . The Chilean figure of 18.9 per cent was slightly lower than the private system average; the lowest was 9 per cent in Bolivia (because there is neither competition, nor salesmen, nor advertising) and the highest was 40.5 per cent in Colombia (Table 1) (
ii) Competition
Founders of the private system in Chile assumed that market mechanisms (freedom to choose and change AFPs and competition among them) would achieve several important objectives: more AFPs, greater efficiency, lower administrative costs, better compliance (punctual payment of contributions), and maximization of capital returns (Piñera, 1991) . (Table 4 ). In the remaining nine countries with private systems, the number of administrators in 2004 oscillated between two in Bolivia and El Salvador and 13 in Mexico (an average of 6.5), while the degree of concentration in the three biggest administrators ranged from 41 per cent in Mexico (which imposes a ceiling on affiliates per administrator) to 100 per cent in Bolivia and El Salvador, with an average of 76 per cent (Table 1) .
According to the Superintendencia (SAFP), administrative costs per insured in constant 2003 pesos rose 38 per cent in 1989-93, caused by the competition for affiliates, the entry of new AFPs into the market, the augmented activity of the salesmen, and the increase in shifts among AFPs that peaked at 40 per cent of total contributors in 1994. Because the number of salesmen jumped from 2,615 to more than 14,000 in 1989-94, the Superintendencia imposed restrictions on the shifts, and the number of salesmen shrank to 6,000 in one year, and shifts had decreased to 6 per cent of contributors by 2004 (SAFP, 2002 (SAFP, , 2005 .
AFPs have to comply with the following rules to secure their adequate operation: (a) an initial capital that increases with the number of insured; (b) Although these rules provide guarantees to the insured, some of them (a high capital and the minimum capital return), have created difficulties for competition and efficiency; the initial capital was reduced and the largest AFPs authorized to subcontract services with the smaller ones, but that has not impeded a rising concentration in the industry. In addition, most insured lack the data and skills to make an informed selection of the best AFP and are influenced in their decision by advertising and salesmen. The flaws in competition analysed in this section, combined with the fixing of administrative costs as a percentage of wages, have been an obstacle in the reduction of such costs.
(iii) Portfolio Diversification and Capital Returns
The portfolio was diversified little in the early years of the system. In 1983, after the economic crisis and the state intervention of several banks and enterprises to avoid a generalized bankruptcy, there was a high concentration of investment in a few instruments: 44 per cent in public debt and 51 per cent in mortgage bonds, but only 3 per cent in bank deposits and bonds, 2 per cent in bonds of public and private enterprises, and nothing in stocks. Capital returns on the investment of individual accounts have discriminated against low-income insured, have been lower than the corresponding rate of the total pension fund, and higher for those who joined the system at its start than for more recent insured. Because the fixed commission bears more heavily on smaller accounts, in 1981-2004, the real rate of return on investment of the insured with a low income (US$315 in the individual account) averaged 6.2 per cent annually, contrasted with 8.2 per cent of insured with a higher income (US$950), while the average for all pension funds was 10.3 per cent. The last was actually the average return paid to those insured at the start of the system (1981) but it decreased to 8.7 per cent for those who joined in 1991 (Table 5) . These are gross rates, but it is necessary to deduct the commission for old age in order to estimate the net rate that is smaller. The average annual rate of gross return from the inception of the reform in the ten countries with private systems to the end of 2004 varied significantly: from -8.8 per cent in the Dominican Republic to 12.9 per cent in Uruguay, for an average of 7.3 per cent in the ten countries (Table 1) . In 1981-2000, Chile's gross rate of return averaged 11.9 percentage points less than the Selective Share Price Index of the Santiago Stock Exchange; and in 1993-2000, Peru's gross rate was lower than the rate of bank deposits or Brady Bonds (Mesa-Lago, 2004; Gill et al., 2005) .
(iv) Capital Accumulation and Development of the Capital Market
The accumulation of the pension fund in Chile reached US$60,799m at the end of 2004, equivalent to 59 per cent of GDP. In the other nine countries the amount of the fund varied significantly: the highest accumulations were in the countries with the largest economies, highest number of insured, and oldest reforms: US$42,524m in Mexico and US$18,306m in Argentina; conversely, the smallest accumulations were in the smaller economies, with a lower number of insured and more recent reforms: US$476m in Costa Rica and US$488m in the Dominican Republic (Table 1) . Furthermore, the highest capital accumulation is that of Brazil (US$80,000m), the second largest economy in the region and which has a public pension system, though voluntary supplementary pension schemes. It should be recalled that, when the capital accumulation in Chile is balanced with the fiscal cost of the reform, the result has been negative savings in the first 23 years of the reform.
Pension funds in Chile have helped to develop confidence (domestic and foreign) in the stock market, stimulated the growth of insurance companies, and played a key role in the swap of foreign debt into domestic investment that helped to reduce such debt and promoted external investment. AFPs are the principal institutional investors in the financial market and finance five out of nine dwellings in the mortgage market. Based on these positive outcomes some experts assert that the existence of a matured domestic capital market is not an indispensable prerequisite for the privatization of the pension system (Iglesias and Acuña, 1991) . And yet Chile had a capital market many decades prior to the reform, albeit less developed than now; in addition, the significant concentration of the portfolio on public debt and zero or little investment in stocks in seven private systems of the region constitute strong evidence against such an assertion. Even in Chile, after 24 years of reform, serious flaws in the capital market exist that demand regulation: AFPs can invest, jointly or separately, in the same enterprise and influence the value of its stock; insurance companies that are shareholders in AFPs can also invest in their stock; and the huge capital inflow compared with the relatively limited instruments available in the market generates overvaluation of some instruments.
V. SOCIAL EFFECTS OF THE CHILEAN REFORM
There was a controversy in the second half of the 1990s as to whether the main objectives of the pension reform should be economic/financial or social; a more balanced view is that both goals are important and that social goals should not be subordinated to financial targets (Mesa-Lago, 2004 In absolute terms the number of self-employed not covered by the pension system jumped 80 per cent, from 880,000 to 1,580,000 in the same period (SAFP, 2005) . The survey on social protection taken in 2002 (EPS, 2004) indicates that household income is an important factor in the probability of contributing to the pension system, but more significant is to have a labour contract because it increases such probability by 50 percentage points; conversely, being self-employed reduced the probability by 4-11 (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2003) (Santiago: MIDEPLAN).
percentage points in relation to the average (Arenas de Mesa et al., 2004) .
In 2000, 68 per cent of the population aged 60 and above was covered by combining three types of pensions: two contributory (old age and survivors), and one non-contributory (social assistance). Total coverage was augmented little with income, from 63.5 per cent in the poorest quintile to 66.7 per cent in the richest quintile, but coverage by the two contributory pensions combined rose from 23.2 to 65.5 per cent, while coverage by assistance pensions decreased from 40.3 to 1.1 per cent (Table 6 ). Coverage increased with the age of the pensioners, both total and in all income quintiles: among those aged over 75 it was 50 percentage points higher than among those in the 60-64 bracket. In 1992-2000 coverage of the population aged 65 and over by contributory pensions fell from 67.1 to 64.4 per cent, while that covered by assistance pensions rose from 8.3 to 14.7 per cent. As coverage of the active labour force has declined, so has that of the older population by contributory pensions, a trend that will grow in the future (Arenas de Mesa et al., 2005) .
(ii) Contribution Density and Level of Pensions
The pension level in a fully funded system is largely determined by the amount and time length of contributions to the system, as well as the contribution density that is crucial not only in the level of the pension but also in the effective coverage in Chile's private system. The survey of 2002 (EPS, 2004) estimated an average contribution density of 52.4 per cent for all the affiliates to the pension system, that increased with income and age until the 55-64 age bracket. Thereafter it decreased owing to women retiring at the statutory age of 60 and men taking early retirement. The levels of contribution density by percentiles of affiliates and sex in Table  7 show that 20 per cent of men had densities of 98-100 per cent, while only 10 per cent of women had such density; men's average density of 59.8 per cent decreased to 43.8 per cent among women. Men had higher density than women in all age brackets. The type of occupation of the worker also influenced contribution density: 65.8 per cent among salaried insured versus 44.8 per cent among selfemployed insured (Bravo, 2004) .
(iii) Replacement Rates
Until recently, estimates of the Chilean private system's replacement rates (average pension as a proportion of average working-life salary) were based on uniform contribution densities that oscillated from 70 to 90 per cent (depending on pessimistic or optimistic assumptions) and averaged 80 per cent. Simulations of replacement rates using actual contribution densities based on 2002 survey data are 
(iv) Gender Inequality
Women usually have lower pensions than men (in all pension systems). This is partly caused by labourmarket discrimination that results in smaller contribution density owing to: a lower labour-force participation rate, higher unemployment, lower pay for the same task, time out for raising children, and a larger share of unskilled jobs with lower pay and not covered by pensions. In addition, women tend to live about 5 years more than men, which means that their retirement is longer. Finally, ten countries in Latin America (five each in private and public systems) set a retirement age for women 5 years earlier than men. Public pension systems tend to ameliorate such inequalities with solidarity measures, such as unisex mortality rates that do not discriminate for the longer female life expectancy, and transfers from men to women (in Chile, prior to the reform, the blue-collar scheme credited 1 year of contribution for each child alive). Conversely, private systems accentuate gender inequality, because the fully funded individual accounts estimate pensions based on the contributions paid, the contribution density, the different risks of the insured, and mortality tables differentiated by sex. As women have a lower contribution density, earlier statutory ages of retirement, and longer life expectancy than men, their accumulated pension funds in their individual accounts are not only lower than those of men but they must be stretched for a 5-10-year longer retirement period, leading to a lower annuity pension (Bertranou and Arenas de Mesa, 2003; MesaLago, 2004 We have seen that replacement rates depend on the insured's income level, gender, retirement age, and contribution density. A woman who retires at age 65 with the maximum taxable income (60 UF = US$1,900 monthly) has a replacement rate of 34 per cent; the rate of a woman under the same conditions but with the minimum salary (7 UF = US$220 monthly) only declines to 33 per cent. However, at retirement age 60 the respective rates for women decrease to 24 and 22 per cent (Table 9 , top segment). A higher age of retirement and 5 additional years of contributions increase the women's replacement rate by 10-11 percentage points and the pension level by 50 per cent. Because women have an average contribution density 16 percentage points lower than that of men (EPS, 2004) , they have a smaller accumulation in their individual accounts at the time of retirement, a lower replacement rate, and a smaller pension level. The unisex mortality tables used in the private system estimate a rate of 35 per cent for women retiring at age 65, contrasted with a rate of 46 per cent for men under the same conditions (except a higher contribution density); hence the women's rate is 76 per cent of the men's rate. For all the reasons given above, it has been estimated that 35 per cent of women who are now in the 40-45 age bracket will get pensions inferior to the assistance pension level; an additional 10 per cent will get a pension higher than the assistance one but lower than the minimum pension, and, therefore, 45 per cent will receive a pension lower than the minimum pension (Arenas de Mesa et al., 2005) . In summary, although on average women in the private system have about 3 percentage points higher coverage than men, women in the lower income quintiles, with no or a low level of education, in occupations such as domestic service, unpaid family worker, and self-employed, and in the 35-44 age bracket have lower coverage than men. In addition, women have lower replacement rates and pensions than men, and 45 per cent of the female insured will get a pension lower than the minimum pension.
(v) Redistribution Effects
Despite its importance and 25 years of operation, the distribution effect of Chile's private pension system is one of its least studied issues. The 2002 survey indicates which groups will benefit most and which will receive insufficient pensions and require state protection in their old age (EPS, 2004) . The private pension system expands existing differences in the labour market between affiliates of divergent income levels, thus among active workers there is an 8.6 times ratio between the maximum taxable monthly income and the minimum salary (60 UF divided by 7 UF), but among pensioners in the two income groups the said ratio increases to 9.3 times. Such inequality is further expanded when introducing the new estimated uniform contribution density (not differentiated by sex) by income level because of the positive relationship between income and density. Based on the density of contribution by quintiles of income per capita in households, the replacement rates of the insured earning the maximum taxable income are 14 percentage points higher than the corresponding rates of the insured earning the minimum salary; based on quintiles of remuneration, the difference is 11 percentage points higher (Arenas de Mesa et al., 2005) . The ratio between the pensions earned by the insured with the maximum and minimum income (60 UF versus 7 UF) rises from 9.3 to 13 times (Table 9 ).
VI. LESSONS OF THE EFFECTS OF CHILE'S AND OTHER REFORMS (i) Macroeconomic Effects
Although it was not possible to test the assumption that the pension reform would result in an increase in national savings, we showed that during the first half of the transition period in Chile (1981 Chile ( -2004 , the longest reform in operation in the region) fiscal costs averaged 5.5 per cent of GDP annually, doubling the 2.5 per cent average annual capital accumulation in the pension fund and resulting in a net deficit averaging 3 per cent of GDP yearly. The heavy fiscal burden was financed with a tight fiscal discipline that generated an annual average surplus of 8.5 per cent of GDP in the period, a condition that has not been met by several similar reforms in the region. Original projections of fiscal costs in Chile underestimated them, as has happened in other countries. More realistic projections in this article for 2005-10 indicate that fiscal costs will still average 5 per cent of GDP. It is assumed that they do not have dependants because the pension is only granted to a dependent invalid spouse (male). 
(ii) Microeconomic Effects
Structural reforms in Chile and two other countries eliminated the employer's contribution and reduced it in two other countries, increasing the workers' share or the fiscal costs, or both; the average share of workers in the total contribution in ten private systems was 65 per cent in 2004, violating the ILO minimum standard that such a share should not exceed 50 per cent of the contribution. The insured in Chile also pay administrative costs that have increased by almost 5 per cent in real terms during the reform; in the ten private systems such costs averaged 20 per cent of income from commissions for the old-age scheme alone in 2004. Competition among AFPs in Chile and in other private systems suffers from flaws, such as a small number of administrators and high and increasing concentration among the largest three. The portfolio of the pension fund in Chile has been diversified in the last 20 years, but not so in the other seven private systems, where 49-86 per cent is invested in public debt, with little or nothing on stocks and foreign instruments-a high risk illustrated by the problems endured during the crisis in Argentina. Capital returns on investment in Chile have discriminated against the low-income insured, exhibit a declining trend, and have been lower than returns from the Santiago stock exchange. Chile has the highest capital accumulation of the pension fund among private systems (59 per cent of GDP in 2004), but the biggest accumulation in the region is in Brazil's voluntary supplementary pension funds to a public pension system; in small countries capital accumulation in only 2-3 per cent of GDP. Chile's pension reform has contributed to the development of a previously existing capital market, but the assertion that a matured capital market is not needed as a precondition of pension reform is negated by both the experience of Chile and several other private systems, particularly in small countries.
(iii) Social Effects
Coverage of the EAP in Chile declined from 64 per cent before the reform to 57 per cent in 2004. The same has happened in the other nine private systems, showing an average fall from 38 to 26 per cent; coverage of the elderly population by contributory pensions in Chile has declined, but that by assistance pensions has increased. Recent projections of replacement rates in Chile based on survey data are 16-27 percentage points lower than previous projections based on optimistic assumptions on contribution density. Private systems accentuate gender inequality resulting from labour-market discrimination against women and their lower ages of retirement and higher life expectancy vis-à-vis men, because they use sex-differentiated instead of unisex mortality tables as in public systems, and the pension is based on the sum accumulated in the individual account, which is smaller for women owing to their lower contribution densities and replacement rates (in Chile 16 and 18 percentage points less, respectively) and a longer period of retirement. For these reasons women's pensions in Chile are 50 per cent lower than those of men on average, and 45 per cent of women are projected to receive either an assistance pension or a minimum pension. Chile's structural reform has expanded existing differences in the labour market, where the ratio between the maximum taxable income and the minimum salary is 8.6 times, but this ratio will increase to 9.3 times among pensioners in the two income groups, and to 13 times when incorporating contribution densities differentiated by sex.
The problems summarized above require reforms in order to correct them and improve the private pension systems and the welfare of the active and passive populations. In 2005 there were several reform proposals. Among them are: the expansion of social assistance pensions to cover all the poor effectively; legal measures and fiscal incentives to incorporate self-employed workers; improvement of the guaranteed minimum pension for those unable to meet its requirements; unisex tables to estimate pensions; elimination of the fixed commission; strengthening of the detection of delays and collection of payment from employers; and more agile tribunals to handle employer's debt (Programa de Gobierno Michelle Bachelet, 2005; Seminario 'Nuevas Modalidades de Trabajo y su Implicancia en la Seguridad Social ', 2005) .
